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ABSTRACT
In an influential paper, Baily (1978) showed that the optimal level of unemployment insurance (UI)
in a stylized static model depends on only three parameters: risk aversion, the consumption-
smoothing benefit of UI, and the elasticity of unemployment durations with respect to the benefit
rate. This paper examines the key economic assumptions under which these parameters determine
the optimal level of social insurance. A Baily-type expression, with an adjustment for precautionary
saving  motives,  holds  in  a  very  general  class  of  dynamic  models  subject  to  weak  regularity
conditions. For example, the simple reduced-form formula derived here applies with arbitrary
borrowing  constraints,  endogenous  insurance  markets,  and  search  and  leisure  benefits  of
unemployment. A counterintuitive aspect of this result is that the optimal benefit rate appears not
to depend on (1) any benefit of UI besides consumption-smoothing or (2) the relative magnitudes
of income and substitution effects in the link between UI benefits and durations. However, these
parameters enter implicitly in the optimal benefit calculation, and estimating them can be useful in








As social insurance programs grow rapidly in developed economies, a large literature assessing
the economic costs and beneﬁts of programs such as unemployment and disability insurance
has emerged. The canonical normative analysis of social insurance is due to Baily (1978).
Baily analyzes a stylized model of unemployment and obtains a simple inverse-elasticity for-
mula for the optimal unemployment insurance (UI) beneﬁt rate in terms of three parameters:
(1) the elasticity of unemployment durations with respect to beneﬁts, which captures the
moral hazard cost of beneﬁt provision due to behavioral response; (2) the drop in consump-
tion as a function of UI beneﬁts, which quantiﬁes the consumption-smoothing beneﬁts; and
(3) the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion (γ), which reﬂects the value of having a smoother
consumption path. Guided by the intuition that these parameters are central in assessing
the welfare consequences of unemployment insurance, many papers have estimated the ef-
fect of UI beneﬁts on durations (e.g. Moﬃtt (1985), Meyer (1990)) and consumption (e.g.
Gruber (1997), Browning and Crossley (2001)).
Since Baily’s contribution, several studies have observed that his framework is restrictive
and argued that the optimal level of social insurance diﬀers under alternative assumptions.
Examples include models with borrowing constraints (Flemming 1978; Crossley and Low
2005), more general search technologies (Lentz 2004), and human capital accumulation ef-
fects (Brown and Kaufold 1988). These papers derive formulas for the optimal beneﬁt level
in terms of the primitive structure of the model, and show that changing these primitives
can have quantitatively large eﬀects on optimal beneﬁt rates in simulations. More recently,
Golosov and Tsyvinski (2005) show that the welfare gain from government intervention is
greatly reduced in models that allow for private insurance markets. Other studies have
remarked on the limits of Baily’s results less formally. Feldstein (2005) notes that cal-
culations of optimal UI based on Baily’s formula could be misleading because they do not
adequately account for savings responses, while Gruber (1997) calibrates Baily’s formula and
1cautions that the introduction of leisure beneﬁts of unemployment could potentially change
his results.
While these studies have identiﬁed several important factors in the analysis of social
insurance, they have not attempted to obtain a reduced-form expression for the optimal
beneﬁt level based on observable elasticities (rather than deep primitives) in the more general
setting that they consider. This paper investigates the key economic assumptions necessary
to obtain such a formula.
I study a dynamic model where agents choose consumption, unemployment durations,
and M other behaviors, such as spousal labor supply or human capital decisions, that enter
a general time-separable utility function. Agents face a budget constraint and N other
constraints, such borrowing or hours constraints, when choosing these behaviors. An arbi-
trary stochastic process determines the agent’s employment status at each time. The model
abstracts from the eﬀects of UI on ﬁrm behavior by assuming that the supply of jobs and
wage rates are not endogenous to the beneﬁtl e v e l . 1
The main result is that Baily-type expressions for both the optimal beneﬁt level and the
marginal welfare gain from an increase in social insurance apply much more generally than
suggested by the existing literature.2 In particular, suppose each constraint on consumption
while unemployed can be loosened by raising beneﬁts, and each constraint on consumption
while employed can be loosened by reducing the UI tax. As discussed below, virtually any
economically plausible constraint in a model where income streams are fungible satisﬁes this
requirement. Then, under some weak regularity conditions that make the government’s
optimization problem well behaved, the optimal beneﬁt rate is approximately determined by
the same three parameters described above, along with the coeﬃcient of relative prudence.
1Because of this limitation, the formula derived in this paper does not apply to the recent equilibrium
models of UI analyzed by Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) and others.
2Though the model analyzed here refers to an unemployment shock, with a change of notation, the general
case can be used to model social insurance against other shocks such as injury or disability. In this sense,
the formula derived here is informative about optimal state-contingent redistributive policies in general and
not just unemployment insurance.
2The approximation requires that fourth and higher-order terms of utility over consumption
are small; calibrations with power utility functions indicate that the error associated with
this approximation is on the order of 2-4%. When the third-order terms of utility are small as
well (i.e., when agents do not have precautionary savings motives), Baily’s three-parameter
formula carries over directly to the general case.
These results show that calculations of the optimal beneﬁt rate based on reduced-form
empirical estimates are valid in much broader environments than earlier studies have sug-
gested. For example, the simple formulas derived here hold even with arbitrary borrowing
constraints, endogenous insurance through channels such as spousal labor supply, leisure
beneﬁts of unemployment, portfolio choice, durable goods, and human capital decisions.
Variations in the structure of the underlying model do not aﬀect the formula because the
four primary inputs are suﬃcient statistics for the purpose of computing the optimal beneﬁt
l e v e li nag e n e r a le n v i r o n m e n t .
T h ec o n v e r s eo ft h i sr e s u l ti st h a tt h eo p t i m a lb e n e ﬁtr a t ed o e snot explicitly depend on
several other parameters that one intuitively expects should matter. For example, factors
such as the leisure beneﬁts of unemployment or the potential role of UI in improving job
matches by subsidizing search seem to play no role in the calculation of the optimal beneﬁt
level. In addition, the relative magnitudes of income and substitution eﬀects in the link
between UI and durations appear to be irrelevant.
The second part of this paper explores why the formula exhibits these features. The
basic reason is that the elasticities that enter the formula are all functions of other aspects
of the agent’s behavior and preferences. For instance, if unemployment has large leisure
beneﬁts, agents would elect to have a longer duration and therefore a larger consumption
drop, ultimately leading to a higher optimal beneﬁt rate, as one would expect. The formula
presented below is thus only one representation of a reduced-form expression for optimal
beneﬁts. To illustrate why the restrictions implied by diﬀerent representations of the formula
matter, I analyze how income and substitution eﬀects in unemployment durations relate to
3the optimal beneﬁt level in greater detail. Using a Slutsky decomposition, I show that
γ (risk aversion) is pinned down by the ratio of the income elasticity to the substitution
elasticity. Large income eﬀects imply higher risk aversion and therefore generate a higher
optimal beneﬁt rate, as one would expect given that income eﬀects are non-distortionary.
However, conditional on the value of γ and the other three primary inputs, the magnitudes
of the income eﬀect is irrelevant.
This point reveals an important tradeoﬀ in evaluating policies using the formula pro-
posed here. The power of this reduced-form approach is that it does not require complete
speciﬁcation of the underlying model, permitting an analysis that is not sensitive to speciﬁc
modelling choices. The danger is that one might choose elasticities that are inconsistent with
each other or with other behavioral responses. In the income eﬀects example, one might
calibrate the formula with a low risk aversion parameter (as in certain cases considered by
Baily (1978) and Gruber (1997)), failing to recognize that this would contradict empirical
studies that have identiﬁed large income eﬀects on labor supply for the unemployed (e.g.
Mincer 1962, Cullen and Gruber 1998, Chetty 2005). This inconsistency is not immediately
apparent because the set of primitives generating the high-level elasticities is never explic-
itly identiﬁed. Hence, while the formula for optimal social insurance derived here is widely
applicable, it should ideally be implemented with support from empirical estimates of other
behavioral responses coupled with structural tests for consistency of the various parameters.
T h er e m a i n d e ro ft h ep a p e ri so r g a n i z e da sf o l l o w s . T h en e x ts e c t i o nd e r i v e sf o r m u l a s
for the optimal beneﬁt level and the welfare gain from raising beneﬁts in a stylized model to
build intuition. Section 3 shows that these formulas carry over with small modiﬁcations to
the general case. Section 4 turns to the counterintuitive features of the result, demonstrating
in particular how the size of income and substitution eﬀects matter. The ﬁnal section oﬀers
concluding remarks.
42T h e O p t i m a l U I B e n e ﬁt Level
I consider the optimal beneﬁts problem in a model where agents receive a constant unem-
ployment beneﬁto fb while unemployed.3 The government ﬁnances the beneﬁts by levying
a lump-sum tax of τ on employed agents. The lump-sum tax assumption simpliﬁes the
algebra, and also has the virtue of describing actual practice. In the United States, UI
beneﬁts are ﬁnanced by a payroll tax applied only to the ﬁrst $10,000 of income, and is thus
inframarginal (and eﬀectively a lump-sum tax) for most workers.
I make three substantive assumptions throughout the analysis. First, I take wages as
ﬁxed, ignoring the possibility that UI beneﬁts have general-equilibrium eﬀects by changing
the supply and demand for jobs with diﬀerent risk characteristics. Second, I abstract from
distortions to ﬁrm behavior (e.g., those caused by imperfect experience rating) by assuming
that expected unemployment durations are fully determined by workers who take their tax
burden as ﬁxed. Finally, I assume that agents’ choices have no externalities, so that all
private and social marginal costs are equal in the absence of a government UI system. For
example, spillovers in search behavior and distortions in the economy that create wedges
between private and social marginal costs are ruled out.
2.1 A Special Case: Tenure Review
I begin with a stylized model where the derivation of the optimal beneﬁtr a t e( b∗)i sm o s t
transparent. This model should not be viewed as a realistic depiction of the UI problem
since it ignores important features such as search behavior under uncertainty and borrowing
constraints while unemployed. Despite these limitations, the simple model is informative
because the formula for the optimal beneﬁt rate in a more realistic and general environment
ends up being quite similar.
3The optimal path or duration of beneﬁts, which has attracted much attention in recent work (see e.g.,
Davidson and Woodbury (1997), Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997), Shimer and Werning (2005)), is outside
the scope of this paper.
5Consider an environment where agents face unemployment risk at only one time in their
lives. For concreteness, it is helpful to think of this model as an analysis of optimal un-
employment insurance for academics being reviewed for tenure. Suppose a representative
assistant professor arrives at his tenure review (time 0) with assets A0. He lives for one unit
of time after the review, until t =1 . The agent is informed of the tenure decision at t =0 ,
at which point he either gets a permanent job that pays a wage of w (probability 1−p)o ri s
denied tenure and becomes unemployed (probability p). Assume for now that p is exogenous
and does not vary with the beneﬁt level. In the employed (tenured) state, there is no risk
of job loss until death, and the agent makes no labor supply choices. In the unemployed
state (where tenure has been denied), the agent must search for a new job. Assume that the
agent can control his unemployment duration, D, deterministically by varying search eﬀort.
Search costs, the leisure value of unemployment, and the beneﬁts of additional search via
improved job matches are captured by a concave, increasing function ψ(D).
The only constraints are the budget constraint in each state. Assume for simplicity that
the UI tax τ is collected only in the tenured state, so that the agent has to pay no taxes while
working in a new job if he lost his job at t =0 . Normalize the interest rate and discount rate
at 0. Since there is no uncertainty, discounting, or income growth after the tenure decision
is known, the optimal consumption path is ﬂat in both states. Let ce denote consumption
in the tenured state and cu denote consumption in the untenured state. Let u(c) denote
utility over consumption, which I assume is strictly concave and state-independent. The
a g e n t ’ sp r o b l e ma tt i m e0i st h u st oc h o o s ece, cu,a n dD to
max(1 − p)u(ce)+p{u(cu)+ψ(D)}
s.t. A0 +( w − τ) − ce ≥ 0
A0 + bD + w(1 − D) − cu ≥ 0
Let V (b,τ) denote the solution to this problem for a given unemployment beneﬁt b and
6UI tax τ. The benevolent social planner’s problem is to choose the beneﬁtr a t ea n dU I
tax pair {b,τ} that maximizes the agent’s indirect utility subject to the balanced-budget




s.t. (1 − p)τ = pbD
The following proposition gives two approximate solutions to this problem. Note that this
and subsequent results about the optimal beneﬁtr a t ec h a r a c t e r i z eb∗ when it is positive.
When this condition has a positive solution, that solution is a global maximum. When
there is no solution to the equation that deﬁnes b∗ at an interior optimum, it follows that
b∗ =0under the regularity conditions used to ensure strict concavity of V (b).
Proposition 1 If the third and higher order terms of u(c) are small (u000(c) ≈ 0), the optimal





∗) ≈ εD,b (1)































= elasticity of duration w.r.t. beneﬁts
Proof. At an interior optimum, the optimal beneﬁtr a t em u s ts a t i s f y
dV/db(b
∗)=0
where dV/db denotes the total derivative of V w.r.t. b, recognizing that τ is a function of b
determined by the government’s budget constraint. To calculate dV/db,n o t eﬁrst that V (b)
c a nb ew r i t t e na s
V (b)= m a x
ce,cu,D,λe,λu
(1 − p)u(ce)+p{u(cu)+ψ(D)}
+ λe[A0 +( w − τ) − ce]+λu[A0 + bD + w(1 − D) − cu]
where λe and λu are the LaGrange multipliers that give the marginal value of relaxing the
budget constraint while employed and unemployed. Since this function has already been
optimized over {ce,c u,D,λe,λu}, changes in these variables do not have ﬁrst-order eﬀects on










8Agent optimization implies that the multipliers are equal to the marginal utility of consump-
tion in each state:























This optimality condition captures a basic intuition that carries over to the general case:
The optimal level of beneﬁts oﬀsets the marginal beneﬁt of raising consumption by $1 in the
untenured state (RHS of (7)) against the marginal cost of raising the UI tax in the tenured
s t a t et oc o v e rt h er e q u i r e di n c r e a s ei nt h eU Ib e n e ﬁt( L H So f( 7 ) ) . T h em a r g i n a lc o s to f
raising the UI tax to ﬁnance a $1 increase in cu is given by the direct cost u0(ce) plus an added
term arising from the agent’s behavioral response of extending his unemployment duration,










This equation provides an exact deﬁnition for the optimal beneﬁt rate, and can be solved
for b∗ by choosing a function form for u. An approximate solution can be obtained by
4If the UI tax were collected in both the tenured and untenured states, the u0(ce) term in (7) would be
replaced by an average of marginal utilities over the times when the agent is employed, as in the general case
analyzed below.








































Plugging this expression into the left hand side of (8) and factoring yields the formula
given in (2). Note that u000 =0⇒ ρ =0 , in which case (2) reduces to (1).
To prove that b∗ is a global maximum, one can show that d2V
db2 < 0. This condition is
established under certain regularity conditions for the general case below.
The ﬁrst approximate solution for b∗ given in Proposition 1 is the same as Baily’s (1978)
formula. He ignores third-order terms of u in his derivation, eﬀectively assuming that
precautionary savings motives are small, in which case utility is well approximated by a
quadratic function. Unfortunately, the approximation error induced by ignoring the third-
order terms in this case is sometimes large. In particular, using power (CRRA) utility
with γ ranging from 1 to 5, the ∆c
c (b) function as given by Gruber’s (1997) estimates, and
εD,b =0 .5, Baily’s approximate solution sometimes underestimates the exact b∗ by more
than 30%. To obtain a more precise solution, the eﬀects of third-order terms in u must
be taken into account. This yields the formula in (2), which has an additional coeﬃcient
of relative prudence term. This formula, which assumes that the fourth and higher-order
terms of u are small, is a much more successful approximation: the diﬀerence between the
exact and approximate b∗ is always less than 4% for the calibration exercises described above.
Hence, using an estimate of the reduced-form relationship between ∆c
c and b,o n ec a no b t a i n
10a reasonably good estimate of the optimal b∗ by solving (2) for b.5
It is helpful to remark on the mechanism underlying Proposition 1 since it carries over
to the general case. At a mathematical level, the basic idea is to exploit the envelope
condition, which permits us to write the marginal value of raising b purely in terms of the
multipliers λu and λe. Agent optimization then allows us to express λu and λe in terms
of the marginal utilities of consumption in each state, as in (5) and (6). Intuitively, the
results arises because the agent has already equated all marginal utilities within each state
at the optimum. Therefore, we can assume that extra beneﬁts are spent on solely on cu
(and that higher taxes are ﬁnanced solely by reducing ce) when computing welfare changes.
This allows us to write the welfare change purely in terms of u0(cu) and u0(ce) and ignore
all behavioral responses when calculating b∗ except for the εD,b parameter that enters the
government’s budget constraint directly. The next section shows that an envelope condition
can be applied to obtain a similar formula for b∗ in a more general environment.
3T h e G e n e r a l C a s e
Choice variables. Consider a continuous-time dynamic model where a representative agent
faces persistent unemployment risk. Normalize the length of life to be one unit, so that
time t ∈ [0,1].L e t ωt denote a state variable that contains the information from the agent’s
history up to time t relevant in determining period t employment status and behavior. For
example, ωt may include prior employment records, which determine current employment
status and future job layoﬀ probabilities. For notational simplicity, it is convenient to
assume that ωt is a scalar, but all of the results that follow hold if ωt were a vector. The
evolution of ωt is determined by an arbitrary stochastic process. Let Ft(ωt) denote the
5One can of course formulate examples where even the third-order approximation will not work well. If
one has strong priors about the fourth-order terms of u, they can be used to obtain a more precise formula
for b∗ by expanding the Taylor series in (9) by one more term.
11unconditional distribution function of ωt given information available at time 0.A s s u m e
that Ft is a smooth function and let Ω denote the maximal support of Ft.
The agent chooses behavior at each time t contingent on the value of ωt.L e t c(t,ωt)
denote consumption at time t in state ωt. The agent also chooses a vector of M other
b e h a v i o r si ne a c hs t a t e :x(t,ωt)=( x1(t,ωt),...,xM(t,ωt)). These could include choices such
as search eﬀort while unemployed, reservation wage while unemployed, level of work eﬀort
(or shirking) while employed, private insurance purchases, amount of borrowing from friends,
portfolio choice, human capital investments, etc. Assume that utility is time-separable and
let u(c(t,ωt),x(t,ωt)) denote the felicity utility of the agent as a function of his choices.
I assume that utility is state-independent, i.e. that the marginal utility of consumption is
determined purely by the current level of consumption and not whether the agent is currently
employed or unemployed.6 Let c = {c(t,ωt)}t∈[0,1],ωt∈Ω and x = {x(t,ωt)}t∈[0,1],ωt∈Ω denote
the full program of state-contingent choices over life.
Let θ(t,ωt,c,x) denote an agent’s employment status at time t in state ωt.I f θ =1 ,t h e
agent is employed, and if θ =0 , the agent is unemployed. Since θ is an arbitrary function of
ωt, which is a random variable, the model allows for uncertainty in unemployment duration
lengths. I allow θ to be a function of c and x because the agent’s choices (e.g. search eﬀort
or savings behavior) may aﬀect his job search decisions and therefore his employment status.
Deﬁne D(c,x) as the expected fraction of his life that the agent spends unemployed given
a program (c,x). Note that this and all subsequent expectations are taken over all times
and all states (histories up to t):






To reduce notation, the arguments of θ and D are sometimes suppressed below when the
6If utility is state-dependent, the arguments below go through, except that the ﬁnal Taylor approximation
for the diﬀerence in marginal utilities in terms of the average consumption drop requires an adjustment for
state dependence.
12meaning is not ambiguous.
Let ce and cu denote mean consumption while employed and unemployed, respectively:


















Constraints. The agent faces a standard dynamic budget constraint. Income is a function of
his current employment state: he earns w−τ if employed, and UI beneﬁts of b if unemployed.
Income may also be earned from other sources (e.g. borrowing or by adding a second earner).
The eﬀects of these other behaviors on income at time t is captured through an arbitrary
function f(x(t,ωt)).
•
A(t,ωt)=f(x(t,ωt)) + θ(t,ωt)(w − τ)+( 1− θ(t,ωt))b − c(t,ωt) ∀t,ωt (10)
There is also a terminal condition which requires that the agent maintain assets above some
b o u n di na l ls t a t e so ft h et e r m i n a lp e r i o d :
A(1,ω1) ≥ Aterm ∀ω1
T h ea g e n tf a c e sas e to fN additional constraints in each state ωt at each time t
giωt(c,x;b,τ) ≥ kiωt,i=1 ,...,N
Let λω,t denote the multiplier on the dynamic budget constraint in state ωt at time t;
λω1,T the multipliers on the terminal conditions; and λgi,ω,t the multipliers on the additional
constraints. Each of these multipliers equal the marginal value of relaxing the corresponding
constraint in the optimal program.
























Let V (b,τ) denote the maximal value for this problem for a given unemployment beneﬁt
















=⇒ τ(1 − D)=Db
Ensuring that the solution to the social planner’s problem can be obtained from ﬁrst-order
conditions requires some regularity assumptions, which are speciﬁed below.




ωt u(c(t,ωt),x(t,ωt))dFt(ωt)dt)i ss m o o t h ,i n -
creasing, and strictly quasiconcave in (c,x)
Assumption 2. The set of choices {(c,x)} that satisfy all the constraints is convex
Assumption 3. In the agent’s optimal program, the set of binding constraints does not
change for a perturbation of b in some open interval (b − ε,b+ ε).
Assumptions 1-2 guarantee that the agent’s problem has a unique global constrained
maximand (c,x). Together with Assumption 3, these assumptions imply that the Envelope
Theorem can be applied to obtain dV
db (see the mathematical appendix in Mas-Colell, Whin-
14ston, Green (1995) for a proof). Without loss of generality, assume below that all of the
auxiliary g constraints are binding; any constraint that is slack can be ignored under the
third assumption.
The following set of conditions are suﬃcient (but not necessary) to establish that V (b)
is a strictly concave function, which ensures that any b satisfying the ﬁrst order condition is
a global maximum.
Assumption 4. Consumption while unemployed is weakly increasing in b; consumption
while employed is weakly decreasing in τ; and the marginal increment in τ required to ﬁnance









The ﬁrst two parts of this assumption essentially require that the direct eﬀect of changes in
the UI tax and beneﬁts are not swamped by behavioral responses in the opposite direction.
The third part requires that the marginal cost of raising funds to ﬁnance UI is increasing. To




1−D].G i v e n t h a t dD/db > 0, it follows
that d2τ
db2 > 0 in the benchmark case where the duration elasticity of UI beneﬁts is constant
(
∂εD,b
∂b =0 ). Higher beneﬁts raise the fraction of the time the agent is unemployed, shrinking
the UI tax collection base while expanding the length of time that the agent receives beneﬁts.
A marginal increase in b therefore requires a larger increase in τ to balance the budget when
b is high to begin with. ∂2τ
∂b2 c o u l do n l yb en e g a t i v ei fεD,b falls sharply as b rises (
∂εD,b
∂b << 0),
s w a m p i n gt h ed i r e c te ﬀect due to changes in D. Estimates of εD,b are broadly similar across
studies with diﬀerent levels of beneﬁt generosity, suggesting that εD,b does not vary sharply
with b. Hence, under most plausible scenarios, the formulas given here are necessary and
suﬃcient conditions for b∗.
Consumption-UI Constraint Condition. The derivation for the static model shows that
we must be able to quantify the costs and beneﬁts of unemployment insurance solely through
15the marginal utilities of consumption in each state to obtain a simple formula for b∗.T h i s i s
feasible if higher beneﬁts relax all constraints on consumption while unemployed and higher
taxes tighten all constraints on consumption while employed. Intuitively, as long as extra
beneﬁts can be spent on raising consumption while unemployed, we can assume for the
purposes of welfare calculations that the agent will do this at the margin. This will permit
us to write the beneﬁts of UI purely in terms of the average marginal utilities of consumption.
The following assumption states the necessary restrictions on the constraints formally.
Assumption 5. The feasible set of choices can be deﬁned using a set of constraints
{giωt} such that ∀i∀t∀ωt
∂giωt
∂b










=0 if t 6= s
Assumption 5 requires that the set of binding constraints can be written so that at all
times (a) the UI beneﬁt and consumption while unemployed enter each constraint in the
same way, (b) the UI tax and consumption while employed enter each constraint in the same
way, and (c) consumption at two diﬀerent times s and t d on o te n t e rt h es a m ec o n s t r a i n t
t o g e t h e r . I ti sh e l p f u lt oi l l u s t r a t ew h e nt h i sc o n d i t i o nh o l d sw i t hs o m ee x a m p l e s :
( a )B u d g e tc o n s t r a i n t s . I nt h es i m p l e s tm o d e l ,t h eo n l yc o n s t r a i n ti st h eb u d g e tc o n -




∂b = − ∂
•
A






∂c(t,ωt) = −1 if θ(t,ωt)=1 .I n a d d i -
tion, only c(t,ωt) appears in each constraint at time t. Hence, assumption 5 is satisﬁed,
explaining why (2) was obtained in the static case.
16(b) Borrowing constraint if unemployed:
g1ωt =( 1− θ(t,ωt))(A(t,ωt)+b − c(t,ωt)) ≥ 0








∂c(t,ωt) =0 ,s o
assumption 5 holds.
(c) Private insurance market. Suppose the agent holds a private insurance contract that
charges a premium ρe when he is employed and has a net payout of ρu in the unemployed
state. This adds a term −θ(t,ωt)ρe +( 1− θ(t,ωt)ρu to the dynamic budget constraint,
implying that the derivatives of
•
A in example (a) are unchanged and assumption 5 still
holds. Abstractly, private insurance arrangements change f(x(t,ωt)), with no consequence
for how consumption and UI beneﬁts/taxes enter the budget constraints.
(d) Hours constraint while employed. Suppose the agent is able to choose labor supply
l(t,ωt) on the intensive margin while employed but cannot work for more than H hours by
law. Then he faces the additional constraint at all times t:







∂c(t,ωt) =0∀t∀ωt, assumption 5 is satisﬁed for this constraint.
(e) Subsistence constraint. Suppose the agent must maintain consumption above a level
c at all times:
g3ωt = c(t,ωt) − c ≥ 0 ∀ωt,t





t) =1 ,s o
assumption 5 is not satisﬁed here.
Though a subsistence constraint can technically violate the consumption-UI constraint
condition, it represents a pathological case. Most agents are able to cut consumption when
beneﬁts are lowered in practice (Gruber 1997). Moreover, such a constraint is unlikely to
17literally bind because one would expect the marginal utility of consumption to rise to inﬁnity
as consumption falls to c, preventing agents from reaching this point. More generally, as
long as diﬀerent sources of income are fungible, agents should be able to use higher beneﬁts
(or lower taxes) to change their consumption in the relevant state. The only reason this
might not be feasible is because of technological constraints on consumption. Since most
economically plausible constraints do not involve such restrictions, they are likely to satisfy
the consumption-UI constraint condition.
Assumption 5 essentially guarantees that the marginal value of increasing beneﬁts and
raising the UI tax can be read directly from the average marginal utilities of consumption
in each state. The following lemma establishes this connection.




























Proof. Since behavioral responses to the change in beneﬁts have no ﬁrst-order eﬀect on
























Using the third part of assumption 5, agent optimization requires that the marginal utility
18of consumption in each state can be written as a function of the corresponding multipliers
at time t:
u

























After plugging these expressions into (12) and factoring out the θ terms, we can substitute
















Substituting in the deﬁnitions of D and Eu0(cz) for z ∈ (e,u) yields (11).
Lemma 1 reﬂects the same basic intuition that underlies (7) in the static model. The
marginal value of raising beneﬁts by one dollar is the average marginal utility of consumption
while unemployed times the amount of time unemployed less the marginal cost of raising
those funds from the employed state. This marginal cost is given by the product of the aver-
age marginal utility of consumption while employed and dτ
db. To see why the consumption-UI
constraint condition is needed to establish this result, consider an agent who faces a binding
subsistence constraint while unemployed. This agent will continue to consume c when un-
employed even if b is changed. Consequently, the marginal value of UI beneﬁts cannot be
directly inferred from the marginal utility of consumption, since the beneﬁts are not used to
raise consumption at the margin.
Approximation for Average Marginal Utilities. It can be shown that b∗ depends exactly
on the diﬀerence in average marginal utilities between the employed and unemployed states,
19Eu0(cu) − Eu0(ce), under the preceding assumptions. However, it is convenient to identify
conditions under which the average marginal utility in each employment state can be ap-
proximated by the marginal utility of average consumption in that state (i.e., when the order
of integration can be switched). This is the purpose of the next result.
Lemma 2 If the third and higher order terms of u are small (u000 ≈ 0), the average marginal
utility of consumption when employed (or unemployed) is approximately the marginal utility


















where γ and ρ are deﬁned as in Proposition 1 and se =
[E(c(t,ωt)−ce)2|θ(t,ωt)=1]1/2
ce is the coeﬃ-
cient of variation of consumption when employed and su is deﬁned analogously when θ =0 .




















and substituting in the deﬁnitions of ρ and γ yields (16). If u000 =0 , ρ =0 , and (16) reduces
20to u0(ce). Similar reasoning establishes the result for the unemployed case.
When utility is well approximated by a quadratic function in the region of consumption
ﬂuctuations within an employment state, only the average consumption level is needed to
determine average marginal utility. This is a standard certainty equivalence result for
quadratic functions. If one wishes to take third order terms into account, the formula
also depends on the coeﬃcient of relative prudence ρ and the coeﬃcient of variation of
consumption in each state.
Welfare Gain from UI. I now derive an expression for the welfare gain from an increase
in b relative to the welfare gain of a permanent one-dollar increase in consumption in the
employed state (
dV/db
(1−D)Eu0(ce)). This expression provides a simple money-metric to compute
the welfare gain associated with social insurance.
Lemma 3 The change in welfare from an increase in b relative to the change in welfare





































= elasticity of duration w.r.t. beneﬁts






































To simplify this expression, apply the quadratic approximation given in (15) of Lemma 2 for













The ﬁrst term in this expression can be approximated using a Taylor expansion analogous
to (9) in Proposition 1. Using the deﬁnitions of γ, ρ,a n d∆c
c yields (17).
Lemma 3 shows that the three reduced-form parameters identiﬁed by Baily, along with
the correction factor ρ,a r es u ﬃcient to determine the welfare gains from social insurance
in a general setting. The result indicates that the welfare gains from social insurance are
greater when shocks are more common ( D
1−D large). It also conﬁrms the intuition that larger
consumption-smoothing beneﬁts and a smaller duration response yield a larger welfare gain.
22The key equation in the analysis of the general case is (20), which gives an exact ex-
pression for the marginal welfare gain of increasing b in terms of expected marginal utilities
and the duration elasticity. Lemma 3 proceeds to simplify this equation using the quadratic
approximation given in Lemma 2 for Eu0(ce) and Eu0(cu) instead of the cubic approximation
g i v e ni n( 1 6 ) . 7 This is because the quadratic approximation for these terms is reasonably
accurate for the purpose of computing
dV/db
(1−D)Eu0(ce) and b∗. If the third-order approximations

























e is a correction factor that accounts for diﬀerences in the volatility of
consumption in the two states. This equation shows that the bias of the quadratic ap-
proximation is proportional to the ratio of the coeﬃcient of variation of consumption in the
unemployed and employed states. A rough estimate from panel data on consumption in the
Consumer Expenditure Survey suggests that su and se are around 20%, with su
se between 1
2
and 2. In this range, using a power utility function and other parameters chosen as described
in the earlier calibration exercise, the exact value of
dV/db
(1−D)Eu0(ce) and the approximate value
given by (17) diﬀer by less than 2%. I therefore proceed by assuming Eu0(ce) ≈ u0(ce) and
Eu0(cu) ≈ u0(cu) below.
Optimal Beneﬁt Level. The generalized formula for the optimal beneﬁt level follows
directly from the preceding result on welfare gains.















7To be clear, note that Lemma 3 still uses a third-order approximation for u0(cu)−u0(ce) as in the static
model; it is only when approximating Eu0(ce) and Eu0(cu) that we are ignoring the u000 terms.
23where
∆c
c ,γ, ρ,a n dεD,b are deﬁned as in Lemma 3.
Proof. (a) Necessity. The optimal beneﬁtr a t em u s ts a t i s f y
dV/db(b
∗)=0 (23)















and rearranging yields (22).
(b) Suﬃciency. To establish that the b∗ deﬁned by (22) is a global maximum, we show
that V (b) is strictly concave in b.D i ﬀerentiating the expression for dV/db in (19) gives
d2V/db2 < 0 under the conditions of assumption 4, completing the proof.
The formula for b∗ in the general case (22) coincides with the corresponding condition
(2) for the static model, with two exceptions. First, the inputs reﬂect average behavioral
responses across states and time. The consumption drop that is relevant is the percentage
diﬀerence between average consumption while employed and unemployed.8 The εd,b term is
the eﬀect of a 1% increase in b on the fraction of his life the agent spends unemployed. This
is equivalent to the eﬀect of an increase in b on the average unemployment duration if the
frequency of layoﬀsi sn o ta ﬀected by b.I f b e n e ﬁts aﬀect the frequency of layoﬀs, one must
take both the average duration eﬀect and the layoﬀ elasticity into account to compute εd,b.
The second diﬀerence in the formula for the general case is that it has an added 1
1−d term
that magniﬁes the elasticity of durations with respect to beneﬁts. This is because raising
consumption while unemployed by $1 generates not only the added cost of providing beneﬁts
8Extending this logic, heterogeneity across agents in behavioral responses (as documented in Crossley and
Low 2005) does not aﬀect the formula for b∗ in a universal-beneﬁt program if one uses population averages
for ∆c
c and εd,b in (22). If there is also heterogeneity in γ across individuals, aggregation of utilities is more
complicated and depends on the structure of the social welfare function.
24during a longer duration, also causes a reduction in tax collection because the agent spends
less time employed. In practice, the latter eﬀect is likely to be small, especially if the agent
is usually employed so that 1 − d is close to 1.
It is interesting to note the connection between Proposition 2 and results from the lit-
erature on optimal commodity taxation. The optimal social insurance problem analyzed
above is formally equivalent to the choice of optimal commodity taxes in a second-best en-
vironment, where the commodities correspond to state-contingent consumption. Ramsey’s
(1927) classic analysis of commodity taxation shows that the formula for optimal tax rates
does not depend on untaxed behavioral responses in a ﬁrst-best setting. Similar results on
the irrelevance of untaxed choice variables and constraints on utility maximization can be
obtained in a second-best environment (see Green (1961) or Auerbach (1985)). Analogously,
the present paper shows that the formula for the optimal beneﬁt rate in a social insurance
problem does not depend on the agent’s choice variables and constraints.
Implementing the formula. The formula in (22) is deceptively simple, in the sense that
empirical estimation of its key inputs requires careful consideration of several issues. First,
it is important to recognize that the parameters εD,b and ∆c
c (b) involve total (not partial)
derivatives of D(c,x) and ∆c
c with respect to b. For example, to compute εD,b,o n em u s t
a c c o u n tf o rt h ef a c tt h a th i g h e rb will change many behaviors (such as savings rates), and
each of these behavioral responses will feed back into the choice of D.E s t i m a t i n g t h e
total response would therefore be diﬃcult if one were to try to identify all the feedback
eﬀects separately. However, reduced-form studies that compare unemployment durations
across states/times that diﬀer only in UI beneﬁt levels (and UI tax rates) identify the total
derivative of interest, because all other behaviors are allowed to vary endogenously.
A second issue in implementing (22) is that one must estimate the eﬀect of UI beneﬁts on
the average consumption drop over a lifetime. Existing empirical estimates of consumption-
smoothing beneﬁts in the literature, such as Gruber (1997), depart from this ideal in two
25respects: (1) they analyze single spells within a lifetime and (2) they only estimate the
change in consumption from the period immediately before (or after) unemployment to the
unemployment spell. The use of data only on individual spells is not a serious concern
to the extent that the cross-sectional distribution of the individuals in a given sample is
representative of average behavior for a given individual over his lifetime. However, the focus
on only high-frequency consumption changes around job loss could be more problematic, e.g.
if consumption trends upward or downward over time while agents are employed. An useful
direction for future empirical work would be to estimate longer-run consumption-smoothing
elasticities.
A third concern in (22) is that one must estimate the parameters in the context that they
are applied. For example, recent studies have found that risk-aversion can vary signiﬁcantly
across the scale of shocks. Risk aversion (γ) with respect to small, temporary shocks such as
unemployment may be much greater than risk aversion with respect to large shocks such as
disability because of rigidities such as consumption commitments (Chetty and Szeidl 2005).
Similarly, risk aversion may diﬀer sharply across income levels or economies. Hence, in
implementing (22), one must be careful to use estimates of γ and other parameters that are
appropriate for the context of interest.
3.1 Implications
Proposition 2 implies that many of the extensions that have followed Baily’s analysis do
not require a reformulation of the optimal beneﬁt rule proposed here, because the four key
parameters in (22) remain suﬃcient statistics for the purpose of computing b∗. Some notable
examples include:
1. Borrowing constraints. If the consumption-smoothing beneﬁts of UI are estimated us-
ing data on consumption rather than simulated based on assumptions about primitives, the
particular features of the underlying borrowing constraints that agents face become irrele-
26vant. Tighter borrowing constraints (or low levels of savings) will generate a larger observed
consumption drop in the data, and therefore raise the optimal beneﬁt level, consistent with
the results of Flemming (1978) and Crossley and Low (2005).
2. Private insurance markets. Equation (22) remains valid when agents can make private
insurance arrangements because these are simply additional choice variables in the general
case. Intuitively, the possibility that social insurance may crowd out private insurance is
captured through the ∆c
c parameter, which will be smaller (and therefore imply a lower b∗)
if agents have already made informal or formal insurance arrangements. One restrictive
aspect of the formula, however, is that the private insurance contracts cannot involve any
moral hazard. Moral hazard in private contracts would create an additional wedge between
the private and social marginal costs of search, violating the “no externalities” assumption
maintained throughout the analysis. Insurance arrangements such as spousal labor supply
may not involve moral hazard because the household internalizes the costs of insurance.
However, insurance contracts purchased through a market are likely to involve moral hazard.
In ongoing work, we are exploring whether reduced-form expressions for the optimal beneﬁt
level can be obtained when both social and private insurance involve moral hazard.
3. Multiple consumption goods. The proposition shows that it is suﬃcient to obtain
consumption-smoothing estimates for a single good (e.g., food), provided that the appropri-
ate risk aversion parameter (e.g., curvature of utility over food) is used in conjunction with
this estimate. This is because all the other consumption goods can be placed in the set of x
other choice variables. This point is relevant for two reasons. First, one may be concerned
that existing estimates of consumption-smoothing have limited applicability because they
only consider a few categories of consumption such as food (Gruber 1998). The result here
suggests that from a normative perspective, it is not critical to have consumption-smoothing
estimates for the full consumption bundle. Second, there is a concern that the durability of
consumption may aﬀect optimal UI policy. Browning and Crossley (2003) show that post-
poning expenditures on small durables such as clothes can provide households an additional
27smoothing channel via an “internal capital market,” thereby lowering the optimal level of
unemployment insurance. These eﬀects can be captured through additional consumption
goods and constraints in the general case analyzed above, and ultimately do not aﬀect b∗
conditional on the consumption-smoothing elasticity for food.
4. Search and human capital beneﬁts of UI. Unemployment beneﬁts could aﬀect subse-
quent wages by subsidizing search and improving job match quality. UI could also increase
incentives for risk-averse workers to undertake risky human capital investments (Brown and
Kaufold 1988). Under the assumption that UI is ﬁnanced by a lump-sum tax, the incre-
ment in wages from these eﬀects has no eﬀect on UI tax collections, and is therefore fully
internalized by the worker. Consequently, these eﬀects can be ignored in calculating the
optimal level of beneﬁts; only the consumption-smoothing beneﬁts need to be considered.
5. Leisure value of unemployment. Leisure is also simply another choice variable in the
general framework, and thus has no impact on the optimal beneﬁt equation. The intuition
that all else held ﬁxed, greater leisure value should raise b∗ comes through the ∆c
c term. If
unemployment has higher leisure value (or if there are search beneﬁts), the agent is willing
to sacriﬁce more consumption to take more time oﬀ, leading to a larger consumption drop
and higher optimal beneﬁtr a t e . H o w e v e r ,conditional on knowing ∆c
c and εD,b, leisure or
search beneﬁts have no additional eﬀect on the optimal beneﬁtr a t eb e c a u s et h e ya r ea l r e a d y
taken into account via agent optimization.
6. Dynamic search and savings behavior. Lentz (2004) and others have structurally
estimated job search models which permit agents to optimize savings dynamically and allow
for rich search dynamics. These models are considerably more complex than the static Baily
framework, but are nested within the general case considered here. Hence, they should not
change conclusions about the optimal beneﬁt rate if it is calculated using (22).
The robustness of (22) to variations in the underlying model suggests that it should
provide a reliable estimate of the optimal level of social insurance. Unlike the alternative
“structural” approach, there is no need to explicitly specify the agent’s discount factor, the
28functional form of u, the stochastic process for θ as a function of search eﬀort, etc. As
Gruber (1997) observes, each of these parameters is diﬃcult to estimate, making it diﬃcult
to implement the structural approach credibly. However, the reduced-form approach also
comes with some potential dangers that arise from failing to specify the underlying structure.
The next section describes these concerns.
4 The Apparent Irrelevance of Some Parameters
A surprising feature of the optimal beneﬁt rate formula (22) is that it does not depend on
many elasticities that one would think should aﬀect the costs and beneﬁts of unemployment
insurance. For example, prior studies have investigated the eﬀects of UI beneﬁts on reem-
ployment wages (Ehrenberg and Oaxaca 1976), reservation wages (Feldstein and Poterba
1984), pre-unemployment savings (Engen and Gruber 2001), spousal labor supply (Cullen
and Gruber 2000), and job-match quality (Centeno 2004). According to the formula, none
of these empirical results is relevant to the normative analysis of unemployment insurance.
How can the formula be reconciled with the intuition that these other factors should
matter for b∗? The key is to recall that the elasticities that enter the formula are all
functions of other aspects of the agent’s behavior and preferences. The eﬀects described in
the previous paragraph aﬀect b∗ by altering the values of the main inputs (γ, ρ, ∆c
c ,a n d
εD,b)t h a te n t e rt h ef o r m u l ad i r e c t l y . T h ef o r m u l af o rb∗ could alternatively be written as a
function of these auxiliary parameters. I now illustrate this point formally by focusing on
a speciﬁc example — the importance of income vs. substitution eﬀects in determining the
optimal beneﬁt level — where the potential pitfalls in applying (22) are apparent.
4.1 Income and Substitution Eﬀects
A central insight of the literature on optimal taxation is that the eﬃciency consequences of
taxation, and hence optimal tax rates, are determined by substitution elasticities (and not
29uncompensated elasticities). Since a social insurance program is abstractly a particular type
of redistributive tax, it may be surprising that the optimal beneﬁt rate appears to depend on
the total uncompensated elasticity of unemployment durations with respect to beneﬁts and
not just the substitution elasticity. The reason for the apparent discrepancy between the
two intuitions is that formulas for optimal taxes or beneﬁts have multiple representations. In
the tax literature, a Slutsky decomposition has proved useful in interpretation of the results,
so formulas are typically written in terms of substitution and income eﬀects. However, one
could instead write formulas for optimal tax rates in terms of total uncompensated elasticities
(Sandmo 1976). Similarly, one can obtain an alternative representation for the optimal UI
beneﬁt level in terms of income and substitution elasticities using a Slutsky decomposition.
Exploring the implications of such an alternative representation is particularly interesting
because there is accumulating evidence indicating that unemployment and UI beneﬁts have
substantial income eﬀects. Mincer (1962) found that married women’s labor supply responds
2-3 times as much to transitory ﬂuctuations in husbands’ incomes due to unemployment as
it does to permanent diﬀerences in husbands’ incomes. Cullen and Gruber (2000) exploit
v a r i a t i o ni nU Ib e n e ﬁt levels to estimate an income elasticity for wives’ labor supply between
-0.49 and -1.07. More recently, Chetty (2005) ﬁnds that lump-sum severance payments,
w h i c hh a v ep u r ei n c o m ee ﬀects, signiﬁcantly raise durations. If income eﬀects are large
relative to substitution eﬀects, one would intuitively expect that b∗ should be higher, but it
is not obvious how this would occur if one computes b∗ using (22).
To derive a formula for b∗ in terms of income and substitution eﬀects, let us return to
the static model of section 2.1 for simplicity. Suppose agents receive a lump sum severance
payment of b0 upon unemployment. The ﬁrst order condition that determines the agent’s
choice of D in the unemployed state is then
(w − b)uc(cu)=ψD(D) (24)
30where cu = A0 + b0 + bD + w(1 − D) is consumption in the unemployed state. Intuitively,
the agent equates the marginal beneﬁt of extending his duration by one day, ψD,w i t ht h e
marginal consumption cost of doing so, which is the foregone wage (w−b)t i m e st h em a r g i n a l
utility of consumption.
Now consider the comparative statics implied by this ﬁrst order condition. Implicit
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Equation (27) shows that γ is related to the ratio of the income and substitution eﬀects of UI
beneﬁts on unemployment durations. This connection between risk aversion and duration
elasticities is a special case of Chetty’s (2006) result that labor supply elasticities place
bounds on risk aversion in an expected utility model with arbitrary non-separable utility.
To see the rough intuition for this result, consider the eﬀects of lump-sum and proportional
beneﬁt reductions on duration. An agent’s duration response to a proportional beneﬁt
(b) reduction is directly related to uc, the marginal utility of consumption: the larger is
31uc, the greater the beneﬁt of an additional dollar of income, and the more the agent will
work when his eﬀective wage (w − b) goes up. The duration response to an increase in the
severance payment (b0) is related to how much the marginal utility of consumption changes
as consumption changes, ucc.I f ucc is large, the marginal utility of consumption rises sharply
as income falls, so the agent will shorten his duration a lot to earn more money when his
severance pay falls. Since γ is proportional to ucc/uc, it follows that there is a connection
between γ and the ratio of income and price elasticities of beneﬁts.9
Equation (27) implies that large income eﬀects do indeed generate a higher b∗,b yr a i s i n g
the risk aversion parameter. Yet, conditional on the value of γ, ∂d/∂b0 and ∂dc/∂b play no
role in determining b∗. This observation illustrates why the reduced-form formula should
be used cautiously. When (22) is calibrated with a low value of γ — as in some of the cases
considered by Baily (1978) and Gruber (1997) — one is at risk of contradicting the evidence of
l a r g ei n c o m ee ﬀects described above. Put diﬀerently, (22) is only one representation of the
formula for optimal beneﬁts. Another representation would involve income and substitution
elasticities and the consumption drop, but not γ. Since this alternative representation might
yield diﬀerent conclusions about b∗, it is important to check whether the inputs used to
calculate b∗ are consistent with other estimates of behavioral responses.10
T h ei n c o m ee ﬀect analysis above is just one example of the danger in applying the
reduced-form formula without carefully considering the restrictions implied by a fully speci-
ﬁed structural model. The broader point is that while only a small set of parameters need to
be estimated to draw normative conclusions about social insurance, estimates of other elas-
ticities can be valuable in performing “overidentiﬁcation” tests of the validity of the primary
inputs.
9The derivation here assumes that there is no complementarity between labor and consumption. More
generally, γ is a function of the ratio of income and price elasticities as well as the degree of complementarity.
See Chetty (2006) for details.
10This point applies equally to the optimal tax literature. There, optimal tax rates depend on income and
substitution elasticities, but could equivalently be written in terms of γ instead. One could test whether
the diﬀerent representations yield similar predictions for optimal taxation.
325C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has shown that a simple, empirically implementable formula can be used to
compute the welfare gains and optimal level of social insurance in a wide class of stochastic
dynamic models. Though the analysis focused on unemployment, this formula can also
be applied to analyze other policies (such as disability insurance or welfare programs) if
one restricts attention to the optimal policy in a two-state model with constant beneﬁts
in one state and a constant tax in the other. Hence, reduced-form empirical estimates of
behavioral responses can be used to obtain robust estimates of the optimal size of many
large government expenditure programs.
While the formula derived here oﬀers an improvement over prior studies, there are many
limitations to the analysis. Some interesting possibilities for further work include:
1. Time-varying beneﬁts. This paper assumed that unemployment beneﬁts are oﬀered at
a constant level indeﬁnitely. Simulation results in Davidson and Woodbury (1997) indicate
that the optimal beneﬁtr a t ec a nd i ﬀer signiﬁcantly if beneﬁts are oﬀered only for a ﬁnite
duration, as in the US. A useful direction for future work would be to derive a reduced-form
formula for the optimal beneﬁtr a t ew h e nb e n e ﬁts are oﬀered for a ﬁx e dl e n g t ho ft i m e . I t
would also be interesting to analyze whether the optimal duration of beneﬁts (or the path
of beneﬁts) can be computed using general formulas that are robust to modelling details.
2. Fiscal externalities. I assumed that the only distortionary tax/subsidy in the economy
is the UI beneﬁt. In practice, many behaviors are taxed, and these taxes create “ﬁscal
externalities” that could change the formula for the optimal beneﬁtr a t e . F o re x a m p l e ,
higher UI beneﬁts will in general lower private savings, which could in turn reduce tax
collections from capital gains or dividends. This tax revenue eﬀect is not internalized by the
agent and therefore aﬀects the optimal beneﬁtr a t ed i r e c t l y . I tw o u l db eu s e f u lt od e t e r m i n e
the magnitude of such ﬁscal externalities too assess whether they aﬀect the calculation of
the optimal beneﬁtr a t es i g n i ﬁcantly.
333. General equilibrium eﬀects. In the models analyzed here, all behavioral responses
to UI were solely determined by the agent. This assumption was important because the
envelope conditions used to obtain the formula for optimal beneﬁts relied on the idea that
all endogenous variables in the model are chosen to maximize the agent’s utility. Obtaining
a reduced-form formula that takes equilibrium responses by ﬁrms into account would be
useful.
4. Endogenous takeup. The analysis assumed that all agents receive beneﬁts upon
unemployment automatically. In practice, takeup rates for social insurance programs are far
below 100% and are sensitive to the level of beneﬁts (Andersen and Meyer 1997). Allowing
for endogenous takeup may therefore have quantitatively signiﬁcant impacts on the optimal
beneﬁt level.11
5. Myopic agents. The envelope arguments above rely on the assumption that agents
are optimizing. If agents experience large consumption drops during unemployment because
they are myopic and do not save enough, the formula for the optimal beneﬁt level may be
diﬀerent.
11See Davidson and Woodbury (1997) for simulation results regarding the eﬀect of endogenous takeup on
the optimal beneﬁtr a t e .
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